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This article examines how China’s Communist Party (CCP) sought 
to justify its policies fostering inequality at the urban factory floor in 
the early years after Mao’s death through publications in the People’s 
Daily. The article focuses on three issues that emerged frequently 
in the newspaper: the increased prevalence of incentive wages, the 
abolishment of life-time employment for workers and the evolving 
discourse related to worker influence at their workplace. The arti-
cle shows that the People’s Daily did not simply seek to persuade the 
public that the reforms were compatible with socialism, the news-
paper also took great care to showcase which kinds of behaviours 
and emotions would be appropriate for the new working subject. 
The CCP’s dedication to reforming the population through the press 
makes the People’s Daily an excellent source for tracking norm intran-
sigence on the part of the population. Based on the observation that 
the CCP sought to legitimate policies ending employment security 
many years before such policies were adopted, the article also sug-
gests that public opinion had a direct influence on the timing of the 
early reforms. 
Keywords: media, post-Mao economic reforms, People’s Daily, incentive wages, em-
ployment security
This article examines how China’s Communist Party (CCP) tried to 
legitimate those policy changes that directly affected China’s urban 
workers in the early years after Mao’s death in 1976.1 Legitimation 
was a particularly important problem for the CCP at this time. The 
Party had not only lost its charismatic Chairman, it had also presided 
over ten years of ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976) with state-abetted 
This article can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v38i1.6061.
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violence, shifting political campaigns and widespread disruption of 
urban social services. Moreover, many of the most experienced and 
popularly-respected leaders had died or been removed from office 
during this period. Mao’s hand-picked successor, Hua Guofeng, was 
unknown among the broad public and had few senior connections. 
Taken as a whole, China’s economic growth had been unimpressive 
since 1957, not least compared to the countries on China’s periphery 
who were quickly building up a modern industrial base and integrat-
ing with the globalising economy (Naughton 2007). Unless its industri-
al competitiveness could be improved, China seemed destined to fall 
even further behind.  
When it came to industrial upgrade, the party-state would have to 
rely on its own abilities to reform. The Chinese party-state had nation-
alised almost all industry in the 1950s and replaced the labour market 
with an allocation system under which the party-state assumed re-
sponsibility for dispatching personnel to every major urban workplace 
across the country. These workplaces provided their workers with the 
major social reproduction services, including food, housing, health 
care, schooling, ideological infotainment, pensions, cremation and so 
forth (Andreas 2019; Dillon 2015; Frazier 2002). Chinese peasants, on 
the contrary, did not receive fixed salaries, nor were they offered much 
social service apart from primary education. This article focuses on the 
situation for China’s urban proletariat, the class of people who, accord-
ing to decades of propaganda, possessed the highest consciousness of 
any social class. 
Improving industrial productivity would not be easy. First of all, 
the chaos of the Cultural Revolution had seriously weakened the 
faith of many Chinese citizens in the CCP. Second, the urban work-
ing class, which had been adulated by state propaganda and mobil-
ised to fight against the bureaucracy during the Cultural Revolution, 
had developed ‘a newfound pride in their proletarian status as well 
as a powerful language of class with which to challenge unwelcome 
policies’ (Perry and Li 1997: 193). The Chinese state did not, however, 
possess the foreign capital necessary to import labour-saving equip-
ment, so improving productivity would have to centre on reorgan-
ising production and strengthening the motivation of the workforce, 
who seemed very well positioned to resist changes that might hurt 
its interests. In terms of motivating the workforce, three challenges 
seemed particularly prominent: increasing worker motivation; doing 
away with worker assumptions of absolute job security; decreasing 
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the expectation among workers that their supposedly revolutionary 
consciousness gave them a role to play in the management of their 
workplace. 
When it came to increasing motivation, one way might have been to 
use material incentives, but this had proved problematic for the CCP 
on earlier occasions. Mao and his allies had always preferred to mo-
tivate workers through the power of example, urging local, regional 
and national leaders to appoint particular individuals as ‘model work-
ers’ whose superior exploits were held up for others to emulate (Far-
ley 2019). This had been the primary strategy in the periods when the 
more left-leaning individuals on the Politburo had been most power-
ful, while leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had favoured 
material incentives. Over the years, the prestige of the proletariat and 
social norms favouring relative equality meant that China’s state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) had developed a comparatively undifferen-
tiated wage structure (Riskin 1987). In many factories, senior workers 
drew higher wages than technicians and managers, and worker wages 
were generally pegged to seniority, number of dependents and politi-
cal attitude, rather than to education, skill-level or effort (Frazier 2002). 
In the heady days of the early Cultural Revolution (1966-1967), activist 
workers in many factories managed to abolish pay differentials all to-
gether and to extend permanent positions to those originally hired as 
temporary workers (Frazier 2002: 230ff.). For the post-Mao reformers, 
incentive pay might not have been the answer they were looking for. 
The second challenge for the party-state was that SOE workers ex-
pected to hold on to their position for life, even staying in their facto-
ry-owned apartments into retirement, where distributing their benefits 
also befell their former employer (Dillon 2015). During the Cultural 
Revolution, the strength of workers at SOEs had allowed the informal 
practice of dingti—making worker and cadre jobs inheritable within 
families—to evolve in many factories. This points to the third chal-
lenge for would-be reformers. While the highest political leadership 
was weak and enjoyed limited legitimacy after Mao’s death, workers 
enjoyed high prestige and had recent experience with taking arms to 
defend their interests. As we will see below, these factors generated a 
pressure to formalise worker influence at their workplaces, something 
that had not been seriously considered since the early 1950s (Frazier 
2002). In short, reformers faced three issues in particular: wage incen-
tives might not have necessarily been effective means of increasing 
motivation; neither the formal system nor the expectations of workers 
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would have accommodated layoffs; workers enjoyed social prestige 
and expected to wield influence over decisions at the factory floor. 
Based on this context, this article examines what the main party 
newspaper, the People’s Daily, wrote about labour reforms in the early 
years after Mao’s death. Faced with all of these obstacles, how did Chi-
na’s post-Mao reformers attempt to legitimate the policies that would 
in three decades change the situation for most of China’s urban prole-
tariat from life-long employment and equal wages to extreme precari-
ty and vast income differentials?
Party-state Media  
Previous examinations of how the early reforms were discussed in the 
party-state media have reached different conclusions. Some scholars 
have argued that the new policies were their own most important le-
gitimation because workers were living lives of such material misery 
that they could not but welcome reform (Kroeber 2016). Others have 
focused on the ability of the CCP to persuade the workers that the re-
forms were of a socialist nature, thereby depriving them of their ability 
to unite against them under the banner of socialism (Kluver 1996; Sun 
1995). Yet, others focused almost exclusively on what the People’s Daily 
reveals about disagreement on the Politburo, and did not interrogate 
the newspaper for what it reveals about public sentiment (Weatherley 
2006; Vogel 2011). 
Building on insights from the above examinations, this article takes 
a somewhat different approach by examining contemporaneous arti-
cles in the People’s Daily to see how the reformist leadership used the 
People’s Daily as an integral part of the reforms. As the analysis will 
show, by examining how the reformist leadership used the People’s 
Daily as a part of the reform efforts—rather than reading the paper 
primarily as disingenuous rhetorical trickery or as a battleground for 
Politburo factions—we become able to see how the People’s Daily is a 
valuable source for understanding the evolving relationship between 
China’s workers and the political leadership in this period. 
Research for this article relies on publications in the People’s Daily in 
the years 1976-1988. The People’s Daily has generally been considered, 
by ordinary Chinese and international scholars alike, to be the mouth-
piece of the CCP’s leadership (Shambaugh 2007). In the late 1970s and 
into the 1980s, all of China’s enterprises had to subscribe to the Peo-
ple’s Daily, and articles in the People’s Daily had, for decades, been used 
60   The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 38(1)•2020
Bo Ærenlund Sørensen 
in the mandatory after-hours study meetings at factories, particularly 
during the periods of intense top-down political mobilisation. We do 
not have much information on what ordinary workers in the 1980s 
thought about the People’s Daily, but the CCP leadership put enormous 
emphasis on influencing the citizenry through its control over media 
and other cultural products (Shambaugh 2007; Volland 2003). There-
fore, the paper is a crucial source of information about how the party- 
state sought to influence public opinion (Fang 1994; Fang 2001; Link 
1992; Wilson 1991).  
In terms of analytical framework, this article relies primarily on the 
work of Quentin Skinner (2002), who has offered much insight into 
how anyone wishing to have an effect upon public opinion—‘ideolog-
ical innovators,’ as Skinner dubs them—must necessarily situate their 
arguments in relation to existing norms, morality, ideology, the social 
environment, the political past and the contemporary configuration of 
power relations. In short, what Skinner (2002) highlights is that when 
ideological innovators seek to change public opinion they very often 
face entrenched norms which they can only hope to change by staying 
within the normative boundaries they subtly attempt to rework. In or-
der to properly read the People’s Daily of this period, it is necessary to 
understand that the party-state enjoyed very strong control over the 
circulation of information. It is also important to note that the party- 
state had a long history of omitting, altering and fabricating news sto-
ries to suit its interests. Therefore, the People’s Daily needs to be read 
‘against the grain’. 
In order to select the articles to be included in the analysis, I started 
by selecting five key terms I assumed would be of relevance: work-
ers, socialism, reform, wages and lay-offs.2 I searched for each of these 
five in the digitised database of the People’s Daily in the period 1976-
1988. I then searched for each term in conjunction with the term ‘model 
worker’ (laodong mofan) as I knew that the party-state media had often 
published stories about model workers as a means of educating the 
public. Whenever I came upon a word or phrase that seemed to be par-
ticularly important, I entered it into my spreadsheet as a candidate for 
further scrutiny. This came to include words and concepts that seemed 
to change their meaning over time (e.g., individualism, ‘remuneration 
according to work’), notions and places and people that were or had 
been condemned for various reasons (e.g., Wei Jingsheng, Democracy 
Wall, Li Lisan), metaphors that somehow stuck out by being unusual 
(e.g., ‘shock troops of the new long march’), words mentioned with 
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particular frequency (e.g., democracy, fairness) and words which I 
knew from the relevant literature would be particularly sensitive (e.g., 
strike, workers’ movement, bureaucratism). By continued iteration, I 
ended up selecting, reading and coding around 1000 articles. 
This article comes in three parts, each of which investigates what the 
People’s Daily wrote in the early reform period about the three partic-
ularly onerous labour issues discussed above. The first part examines 
how the People’s Daily framed the topic of worker motivation. The sec-
ond part examines how the newspaper discussed the need to abolish 
life-long employment. The third part examines discussions of worker 
influence at the workplace. What emerges from these investigations 
is that the party-state paid enormous attention to altering the norms 
and expectations of the urban proletariat. It also becomes clear that the 
need for some of the reforms—in particular the need to abolish life-long 
employment—was voiced repeatedly in the People’s Daily long before 
any such policies were implemented. This, as will be discussed below, 
shows that the party-state was so wary of resistance from its workforce 
that it delayed its reforms in response. Finally, the article demonstrates 
how seriously the People’s Daily took its attempts to soften and shape 
popular norms so as to align these with the party-state’s evolving pol-
icies. On this basis, the article shows that the Chinese state-led media 
can profitably be used to draw a topography of norm intransigence on 
the part of the general population. 
How to Motivate China’s Urban Workforce After Mao
When it came to ways of motivating China’s urban workforce, the 
CCP’s new leadership under Hua Guofeng focused initially on em-
ulating the strategies associated with Mao Zedong’s leadership. This 
consisted of arranging local ‘labour competitions’ (laodongjingsai), the 
winners of which would then be selected as model workers and their 
exploits held up for imitation in the media. Such competitions had 
been widely used by the CCP in the 1940s and 1950s (Yu 2015), and 
the new leadership apparently nourished great hopes that the reintro-
duction of competitions would spur worker productivity, as reflected 
by the fact that the People’s Daily published no less than 398 articles 
making mention of labour competitions in 1977. 
These articles highlighted the achievements performed during 
such competitions, which, according to the People’s Daily, were usu-
ally organised by model workers and embraced wholeheartedly by 
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everyone. During such competitions, the People’s Daily claimed, some 
workers had dedicated themselves to production with such vigour 
that they were already fulfilling their quota several years into the fu-
ture. The repeated emphasis that competitions were popular among 
the workers and that they were organised by workers rather than by 
their leaders, along with the fact that stories about competitions almost 
disappeared from the People’s Daily a few years later, suggest that they 
were neither effective nor popular ways of stimulating productivity.
Perhaps in recognition that the labour competitions did not greatly 
encourage productivity, the People’s Daily soon began to publish stories 
touting the desirability of tying wages more closely to performance. 
These articles all focused on the concept of ‘distribution according to 
labour’ (anlaofenpei), which had been written into the Chinese Consti-
tution in 1975 when the more left-leaning leaders in Shanghai had to 
compromise with the more industrial-oriented leaders in Beijing (Co-
hen 1978). ‘Distribution according to labour’, the People’s Daily empha-
sised again and again, originated in Marx’s ‘Critique of the Gotha Pro-
gramme’ where it was put forward as a characteristic of society in the 
initial phase of socialism. 
Unsurprisingly, the People’s Daily never contextualised why Marx 
had put forward ‘distribution according to labour’ as a step towards 
realising socialism. In Marx’s time, the concept had been revolutionary 
because it served to make the point that workers should be entitled to 
the full value of their labour, and that the owners of capital did not 
deserve rent merely because they owned the means of production. In 
China in the 1970s, however, the phrase did not mean that the factory 
owner (i.e., the state) should not reap the surplus value, but instead, 
that salary should be pegged to work performance. With its impecca-
ble socialist imprimatur, the formulation was well suited to make the 
point that workers should be rewarded materially for working harder. 
That the CCP considered the phrase to possess great, potential useful-
ness is attested to by the fact that the party-state leadership devoted no 
less than four major conferences to exploring the meaning of the term 
‘distribution according to labour’ between April 1977 and October 
1978 (Tomba 2001: 25). In addition, the phrase appeared in the People’s 
Daily in 261 and 337 articles in the years 1978 and 1979, respectively. 
While it may thus seem that the Hua leadership was quick to adopt 
both the ‘labour competition’ approach and the ‘material incentive’ 
approach to stimulating its workforce, a closer look at the published 
articles reveal that there was still considerable unease among the 
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party-state leadership regarding the topic of material incentives. While 
the party-state clearly threw its weight behind pegging salaries more 
closely to work performance from the beginning of 1977, the People’s 
Daily repeatedly criticised local factory leaders for issuing performance- 
based bonuses. Distributing such bonuses was, the People’s Daily 
stressed, not the same thing as ‘distribution according to labour’. Rath-
er, such bonuses were ‘material incentives’ (wuzhi ciji), a distinctly neg-
ative term in Chinese, and amounted to putting ‘bonuses in command’ 
(jiangjin guashuai), playing on the late Chairman’s injunction to let ‘pol-
itics be in command’ (zhengzhi guashuai).3 
This somewhat inconsistent approach only found expression in the 
People’s Daily for a few months, and from April 1977, the People’s Daily 
no longer referred to bonuses as ‘material incentives’. It was, it seems, 
necessary to think matters over. Less than a year later, in February 
1978, an article suddenly stated that referring to performance-based 
bonuses as material incentives was a way of thinking that must be 
eradicated.4 That this volte face had the highest political backing was 
made clear later that month when Hua Guofeng voiced clear support 
for performance-based bonuses in his government work report (For-
eign Broadcast Information Service 1978). In the latter half of 1978, the 
People’s Daily published many articles asking whether material incen-
tives were really that bad. That the CCP’s leadership was not entirely 
comfortable with making this point can be seen from the fact that the 
term ‘material incentives’ was soon replaced with the more circum-
spect terms ‘material reward’ (wuzhi jiangli) and ‘material encourage-
ment’ (wuzhi guli). Only one year later, the People’s Daily stopped using 
these terms, and since then the distribution of performance-based bo-
nuses has primarily been described as ‘bonuses’ (jiangjin). 
With the decision of the CCP leadership to embrace material incen-
tivisation, we see, as in previous decades, that some workers were able 
to exert strong pressure on their local factory leaders or workshop 
foremen to have the bonuses distributed equally. The headline of an 
article in November 1978, succinctly conveyed the party-state’s dissat-
isfaction with this situation: ‘Distributing bonuses equally to everyone 
is unreasonable’.5 Over the following years, the People’s Daily repeated-
ly made the point that bonuses should be issued to those who worked 
hard, rather than being divided among all workers. The People’s Daily 
criticised this practice as ‘egalitarianism’ (pingjunzhuyi) in hundreds of 
articles in the period from 1979-1984, and in a further move to ensure 
that bonuses in fact came to stimulate productivity, new rules were 
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issued to tie the size of bonuses to an enterprise’s profits (Tomba 2001: 
66ff.). 
The distribution of bonuses quickly provoked normative interven-
tion by the People’s Daily against individuals transgressing the ascetic 
norms propounded by the party-state for decades. One article from 
March 1979 stated that ‘Some people have erroneous ways of thought, 
and they lavish away their bonus money on eating and drinking’.6 
Through the 1980s, the People’s Daily continued to highlight that peo-
ple should not spend their money on trivialities such as banquets and 
binges (dachidahe). In the early 1980s, public unease about the growing 
wealth gap also brought the People’s Daily to produce articles stressing 
that those who were doing well under the reforms deserved respect, 
but were instead subjected to theft and beleaguered by loan-seekers.7 
This topic was repeated many times in 1983-1984, usually described 
as people with ‘red-eye disease’ (hongyanbing)—a colloquial metaphor 
describing jealousy as a disease—treating those who ‘dared to stick 
out’ (maojianhu) unfairly. 
In its attempts to delineate the proper ways of spending money and 
to alter public norms to fit with the reform agenda in ways both condu-
cive to social stability and the emerging pattern of economic growth, 
the People’s Daily began to increase its focus on another practice inti-
mately connecting money and morality, viz., philanthropy. An article 
from 1982 detailed the experiences of a distillery worker who exposed 
how local cadres routinely commandeered large amounts of liquor. 
The People’s Daily reported that the problem had been resolved, and 
the worker was awarded both a model worker title and a 100 yuan 
prize, which he donated in full to the distillery’s nursery.8
In another account involving philanthropy, a man who had con-
tracted a company9 had done so well that the authorities awarded him 
a model worker title as well 1,000 yuan, which he donated to his com-
pany’s nursery.10 Judging by the People’s Daily, it became increasingly 
common for people who received monetary awards to donate these 
to public organisations. If we examine who received these donations, 
we find that recipients were nurseries, elementary schools, the Chi-
na Children and Teenagers’ Fund and a government-run education-
al amusement park known as the Children’s Palace.11 In other words, 
bonuses and awards were presented by the People’s Daily as morally 
legitimised through philanthropy with distinct paternal overtones; a 
storyline which would become more prevalent in subsequent decades. 
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How to Abolish Life-long Employment
Alongside the efforts of the People’s Daily to alter worker norms and 
expectations in relations to remuneration, in 1979 the party-state began 
to invest considerable efforts into denigrating the notion of life-long 
tenure. This happened through a barrage of references to smashing the 
‘iron rice bowl’ (tiefanwan)—a term used to refer to life-long employ-
ment in state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—and to altering the mindset 
of those who liked ‘food from the big pot’ (daguofan), a negative term 
used to denote people who enjoyed the fruits of collective effort with-
out making proportionate contributions. While these colloquialisms 
had been in common use for decades, they had seldom appeared in 
the press before 1979, when the People’s Daily began to print articles 
claiming that many readers had written to the newspaper demanding 
the abolition of the iron rice bowl, because this kind of employment 
surely made people lazy.12 In 1981-82, the laziness supposedly induced 
by eating from the big pot came to be connected with the national eco-
nomic difficulties of those years.13 
In 1983, the People’s Daily further ratcheted up the campaign to 
abandon the iron rice bowl, one article quoting a representative at 
the Shanghai People’s Congress on how job insecurity could compel 
diligence: 
At some factories where they have [...] broken the iron rice bowl, some 
people have developed a ‘feeling of crisis’ [...] A ‘feeling of crisis’ is not 
a bad thing. If a ‘feeling of urgency’ can develop out of such a ‘feeling 
of crisis’, then all the better. An ‘iron rice bowl’ is very secure, but it 
brings along with it indolence, exasperating sluggishness, lethargy and 
perfunctoriness.14 
Also in 1983, the People’s Daily took to employing rhymes to hammer 
in the message that ‘“the big pan” suckles the lazy Han’ (‘“daguofan” 
yang lanhan’); a rhyme used in nine articles in 1983-1984 and on special 
occasions up until 2020.15 
As so often in the People’s Daily, coverage of international issues was 
used to send messages about domestic reforms. The fact that worker 
unrest could be just cause for terminating an employment relation-
ship was clearly signalled in the paper’s coverage of the 1981 airport- 
controllers’ strike in the US. The articles devoted to this conflict were 
light on denunciations of the hard-bitten approach of the American 
government, marking a clear contrast with previous coverage of the 
tribulations of the American working class. The People’s Daily even 
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went so far as to express sympathy for the problems of the American 
administration and explained that ‘If [Reagan] chooses to make a con-
cession to the airport controllers’ union, this will ignite a chain reaction 
and seriously affect his plans for an economic recovery’.16 
Preparing the population for the abolishment of employment secu-
rity, 1978-1979 also marked the beginning of a great increase in stories 
in the People’s Daily about entrepreneurs (qiyejia), self-employed (ge-
tihu) and individuals setting up their own businesses (chuangyezhe), 
all prospering in no time, according to the People’s Daily. The People’s 
Daily also began to publish stories praising model workers who volun-
tarily abandoned their ‘iron rice bowls’ to start successful businesses 
on their own.17
The first significant step taken towards reforming the labour sys-
tem was not, however, taken until 1986 when legal changes introduced 
five-year contracts for new employees at SOEs; leaving workers who 
were already employed at SOEs unaffected. These changes, along with 
inflation, were probably among the reasons why 1986 saw a number 
of labour unrest episodes, including strikes and occasionally even riots 
in big cities (Baum 1997: 385f.). In 1986, the People’s Daily also began 
to talk about lay-offs in more direct terms. In one case, the head of an 
electrical machinery factory had been removed from his town’s list of 
model worker nominees and subjected to severe criticism because he 
had made redundant a number of mid-level managers. The People’s 
Daily made clear that the criticised leader had acted appropriately, and 
when the paper picked up the case a month later, the leader had indeed 
been cleared of all criticism and even awarded a model worker prize.18 
By the latter half of the 1980s, discussions of the political activities or 
consciousness of China’s model workers almost disappeared from the 
People’s Daily. They were replaced by a new kind of subject, the suc-
cessful entrepreneur. One such article focused on the businesswoman 
Li Guilian who noted that a boss had to be both a ‘loving mother’ and 
a ‘strict father’, and in pursuit of these ideals she instituted a number of 
strict rules for her employees, but also made sure that they all received 
a cake on their birthdays.19
The only thing we learn about Li’s workers is contained in a small 
anecdote noting that they produced clothing of exceptional quality, 
except on one occasion when a worker produced an item of cloth-
ing earning a score of only 96—with 98 being the norm—causing the 
worker to break down in tears for ‘having lost the face to see anyone’. 
Clearly, while managers were portrayed as parents, the workers were 
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cast in the role of children anxious to please. In less than seven years, 
the image of China’s working class presented in the People’s Daily had 
changed from larger-than-life figures of superior political conscious-
ness to timid, childlike creatures. Interviews conducted at the time 
confirmed that China’s workers were acutely aware of their changed 
public image, one worker noting that after the beginning of reform, 
‘the social status of workers is very low, and nobody thinks highly of 
workers. The public opinion and even the leaders hold that workers 
are rude, uncivilized, disobedient, and unsophisticated in speaking’ 
(Cai 2006: 174). 
What made the assault on life-time employment even more remark-
able is that the party-state did not begin to lay off workers from the 
SOEs at this point, and would not do so in any noteworthy degree 
before the middle of the 1990s. When the party-state took no signifi-
cant concrete steps in this direction—at least not before the adoption 
of the Contract Law in 1986, which did not affect workers in existing 
employment relationships—this was due to the fact that the implicit 
social contract was very much focused on providing job security. The 
party-state maintained very cautious labour policies up until the mid-
dle of the 1990s in order to keep urban unemployment low (Naughton 
2007: 183ff.). This meant that overstaffing at China’s SOEs continued 
to grow until the early 1990s (Dong and Putterman 2001). This is a 
good example of how the intentions of the party-state—in this case, 
the intent to lay off workers—could be signalled for years in the state-
led press before the party-state found the time ready to introduce its 
intended policies. 
Worker Influence at Workplaces
The evolving debate over the formalised influence of workers at their 
workplace presents a particularly interesting case study of how divi-
sions on the Politburo allowed for public debate over the institutional 
arrangement of formalised power. The fact that workers were consid-
ered important by the political establishment was reflected, not least, 
in the debate over the expansion of workplace democracy. As men-
tioned above, the Cultural Revolution had infused in many workers ‘a 
newfound pride in their proletarian status’, and the weakened position 
of factory and party leaders—along with a strong fear of new popular 
upheavals—found concrete expression in the adoption of measures 
aimed to institutionalise the influence of workers. 
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The expansion of worker influence at workplaces came to stand out 
as an area of particular emphasis after Deng Xiaoping’s talk at the na-
tional trade union congress in 1978 where he proclaimed that from 
then on, across the country, workshop directors, workshop section 
chiefs and workshop group leaders were to be elected by the workers. 
In addition, all major decisions at the enterprises were to be present-
ed and debated at workers’ representatives’ congresses, which would 
also be vested with the authority to recommend that a particular lead-
er ought to be disciplined or fired.20 Following this speech, the People’s 
Daily published a flurry of articles in 1979-80, stressing the importance 
of increasing the power of workers’ representative congresses. 
At the same time, it was also announced in the People’s Daily that 
model workers were to be ‘chosen through public appraisal’ (pingxu-
an).21 The term pingxuan—here rendered as ‘choosing through public 
appraisal’—did not necessarily mean that model workers would be 
elected by ballot, but it did signal a considerable degree of grassroots 
input. That the phrase was sensitive can be seen from the fact that it 
had not been used in relation to selecting model workers by the Peo-
ple’s Daily since 1957, and that it all but disappeared after 1985. It was, 
however, used in this connection in People’s Daily articles every year 
from 1978 to 1985. The height of enthusiasm over worker input in the 
selection of model workers occurred in March 1980, when the Peo-
ple’s Daily clearly spelled out how model workers were to be selected 
through popular vote.22
Another signal that autonomous worker influence was on the agen-
da in March 1980 was the posthumous rehabilitation in that month of 
Li Lisan, the former leader of China’s official trade union who had fall-
en afoul of the rest of the CCP leadership in the early 1950s by advo-
cating for a degree of independence of the labour union from the Party. 
In the fall of 1980, the People’s Daily, in two separate articles, conjoined 
the terms ‘autonomous organisation’ (zizhi zuzhi) and ‘strike’ (bagong) 
in a positive way.23 The only other People’s Daily article to ever bring 
these two concepts together would appear in June 1989, and this time 
to denigrate the notion that autonomous organisations should involve 
themselves with strikes.24 That workers could be allowed independent 
organising was further indicated by the positive attention that the 
actions of the autonomous trade union Solidarity received in party- 
state discourse (Wilson 1991). By the fall of 1980, it seemed that the 
expansion of institutions for electoral democracy would become a key 
part of the post-Mao reforms, and a significant part of the rationale for 
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doing this, as explained in the People’s Daily, centred on the importance 
of increasing the power of the working class. And then, momentum 
shifted. 
As early as 1978, the political elite had been troubled by strident crit-
icism of the CCP expressed on big-character posters on what became 
known as ‘Democracy Wall’ in central Beijing, but even though the 
most outspoken critic, Wei Jingsheng, had been arrested, the moves 
toward expanding democracy had continued apace. What seemed 
to have caused momentum to shift in the autumn of 1980 were the 
county-level elections in the fall of that year, where several candidates 
anathema to the party-state leadership were elected (Womack 1982). 
Moreover, by the fall of 1980, Deng had established his position of un-
challenged authority within the Party, and he thus no longer needed to 
seek public approval in his attempts to oust Hua from power. 
Having decided to curtail parliamentary democracy, the leadership 
nevertheless felt uneasy about public reactions. This can be seen from 
the fact that the People’s Daily published several articles about prob-
lems with electoral democracy abroad before making any mention of 
elections in China.25 Moreover, rather than discussing the controver-
sies surrounding the county-level elections, the People’s Daily devoted 
several articles to explaining that the participation of the grassroots in 
selecting model workers had caused a number of unworthy workers to 
be selected.26 After this, the People’s Daily no longer mentioned grass-
roots participation in model worker selection, indicating that such a 
practice was no longer encouraged. The remaining county-level elec-
tions were also cancelled, but this was never mentioned in the People’s 
Daily. After 1981, the People’s Daily had most often described model 
workers as ‘gushing forth’ (yongxianchu); a metaphor serving to elide 
the manner of their top-down selection. 
The next step in the curtailment of workers’ rights came in 1982, when 
the right to strike was eliminated from the state constitution (Jones 1985). 
The first article to mention this was printed in May 1982, and consisted 
of a terse, untitled report informing readers that model worker repre-
sentatives unanimously endorsed abolishing the right to strike.27 In the 
accompanying photograph, three model workers stooped over large 
pieces of paper, presumably the draft constitution. Of the two figures 
in front, one was inspecting the documents, while another was writing 
something down, metonymically allowing model workers a hand in 
the drafting of the constitution. The third person looked sternly into the 
camera, signalling his support of the constitutional amendment. 
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Conclusion 
The article has demonstrated that the People’s Daily did not simply at-
tempt to alter the interpretation of what socialism was supposed to 
be, though this was certainly a part of its strategy. Instead, the People’s 
Daily attempted to alter the norms, expectations and behaviour of the 
individuals affected by the increased reliance on material incentivisa-
tion. It has also become clear that the efforts of the party-state reform-
ers to dismantle the expectations of life-long employment occupied a 
great deal of column space from the late 1970s until the latter half of 
the 1980s. While this media campaign was prominent from 1980, la-
bour redundancy in Chinese SOEs only shot up during the 1980s and 
into the early 1990s (Dong and Putterman 2001), even though a bloat-
ed workforce and escalating pension payments made it increasingly 
difficult for SOEs to compete both domestically and internationally. 
This illustrates how popular norms had served to constrain the op-
portunities available to the reformers, as well as how the party-state 
had attempted to use media campaigns to prepare the populace for 
intended reforms. 
The People’s Daily’s coverage of the formalisation of worker influ-
ence at their workplace shows that Deng Xiaoping was eager to asso-
ciate himself with the expansion of electoral democracy. When Deng 
no longer needed popular support against his competitors on the Po-
litburo, and when it turned out that the electorate would sometimes 
return representatives anathema to the party-state, the party-state 
moved swiftly to end the democratic experiments. This decision was 
apparently too sensitive to be discussed directly in the People’s Dai-
ly, which instead attempted to delegitimise popular voting as a use-
ful mechanism of selection by describing electoral problems abroad 
combined with descriptions of how workers were wont to elect the 
wrong people among themselves to serve as model workers. This il-
lustrates how the People’s Daily sometimes attempted to convey mes-
sages through indirection.  
In conclusion, the People’s Daily is not only a useful source for exam-
ining how the Party endeavoured to alter public perceptions of work-
place relations proper to socialism. More importantly, the paper also 
attempted to modify popular norms and expectations to suit the evolv-
ing exigencies of the reforms. Where most previous studies (Kluver 
1996; Sun 1995) have emphasised that the People’s Daily often sought 
to omit and distort information so as to influence popular perceptions, 
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I have argued that the People’s Daily also expressed the party-state’s 
strong belief in its own ability and duty to mould the thoughts and 
habits of the citizenry. In this respect, the party-state not only attempt-
ed to shape the population to fit its policies, but also sometimes diluted 
or delayed its policies so as to fit popular norms and expectations. 
In the period since the 1980s, the PRC media landscape has grown 
increasingly complex. Most citizens have access to a wide array of in-
formation sources, though the vast majority of these are under the con-
trol of the party-state. The People’s Daily continues to function as the 
official voice of the CCP, but its reach and influence has diminished 
significantly. With the deepening of reform in the early 1990s, the Peo-
ple’s Daily began to make new distinctions between different kinds of 
workers. The term previously used most frequently to refer to workers 
(gongren) was supplemented by the terms ‘peasant worker’ (mingong 
and nongmingong) and ‘temporary worker’ (dagongzhe). These new 
terms were useful because they made it possible to talk about the rap-
idly increasing number of migrant workers as a category distinct from 
the previously honoured working class. In general, issues pertaining 
to workers, including migrant workers, have appeared with diminish-
ing frequency up through the period of reform, which has seen a sig-
nificant, albeit fluctuating, number of labour disputes since the middle 
of the 1990s. Individual cases of labour disputes have made it into the 
People’s Daily, but usually only after local authorities have intervened, 
thus serving to send the message that the party-state protects migrant 
workers from the unpredictable fluctuations of the labour market and 
from ‘rotten’ employers.
The People’s Daily has continued to print a substantial, although 
gradually declining, number of stories celebrating model workers for 
their unselfish industriousness. Since the 1990s, model workers have 
frequently been commended for their ability to adapt to changing job 
market demands and opportunities. Stories about model workers have 
come to focus on things unrelated to work, such as joyous family hol-
idays, national sports events, the celebration of PRC martyrs and the 
socio-political issues of the day. For instance, the most renowned mod-
el worker of the 2010s was steel-factory worker Guo Mingyi, who has 
been the subject of a play, a biography, a biopic and more than 500 
People’s Daily articles. Guo is most often celebrated for his endeavours 
to motivate people to become blood donors, at once serving to high-
light an important health sector need as well as implying that the best 
of China’s workers give their blood to the nation. 
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Overall, the People’s Daily published much fewer articles about work-
ers and labour issues in the last decade. That the party-state perceived 
much less of a need to address such issues through the People’s Daily 
is probably a testimony to the fact that the notion of a united working 
class with shared privileges and obligations has lost much of its force. 
The paper continues to make frequent use of the term socialism, but 
the specific meaning of this term has become increasingly difficult to 
pin down and it is almost never invoked in reference to particular la-
bour issues. In other words, the party-state has managed to divorce 
socialism from the proletariat. 
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NOTES
  1 This article is based upon research funded by the Carlsberg Foundation, grant 
number CF18-0838. I would like to thank both the anonymous reviewers and 
the editors for their useful comments and suggestions. 
  2 I agree with Hart and his collaborators that examining key terms is usually a 
productive way of analysing news stories (Hart et al. 2005). This is particularly 
true in the Chinese context, because the propaganda system sets great store by 
controlling the usage of specific words and phrases (Schoenhals 1992). 
  3 People’s Daily, 11 Febraury 1977, p.2, ‘Guanxin qunzhong shenghuo de you-
liang chuantong bu rong jianta’; 25 April 1977, p.1, ‘Gaoju mao zhuxi de weida 
qizhi zou woguo ziji gongye fazhan de daolu—daqing youtian dangwei shuji, 
geweihui zhuren song zhenming quanguo gongye xue daqing huiyi shang 
de fayan’.
  4 People’s Daily, 14 February 1978, p.2, ‘Qieshi zhengdun qiye—shixian zengchan 
zengshou’.
  5 People’s Daily, 4 November 1978, p.2, ‘Pingjun fenpei jiangjin bu heli’.
  6 People’s Daily, 9 March 1979, p.1, ‘Yao ba xinsi fang zai zengchan jieyue yun-
dong shang’.
  7 People’s Daily, 8 March 1984, p.7, ‘Yan dongsheng weihe bu yuan dang laomo?’.
  8 People’s Daily, 28 May 1982, p.2, ‘Kexi de bianhua’.
  9 As part of the economic reforms, private individuals could assume responsibil-
ity for running a state-owned company for a number of years.
10 People’s Daily, 6 March 1984, p.2, ‘Chengbao duixian changzhang shoujiang’.
11 People’s Daily, 24 January 1982, p.3, ‘Daxue xinfing—fasheng zai jianghan shiy-
ou xueyuan de shiqing’; 22 September 1983, p.5, ‘Zhong gua ren de zhuiqiu—ji 
hunan sheng laodong mofan, gaoji nongyishi chen weilin’; 18 October 1984, p.2, 
‘Xi’an shi zhang tiemin jiangjin juanxian gei shaoniangong’.
  73
 The Beginning of the End for the Chinese Proletariat
12 People’s Daily, 11 January 1979, p.2, ‘”Zhejiang ribao” kaizhan “tiefanwan” 
wenti  de taolun, zai shehui shang yinqi hen da fanxiang’.
13 People’s Daily, 22 April 1983, p.5, ‘Ping “daguofan”’. On the economic setbacks 
of 1981-1982, see Meisner 1996:267f.
14 People’s Daily, 19 February 1983, p.1, ‘Jinri tan’.
15 People’s Daily, 27 January 1983, p.1, ‘“Daguofan” yang lanhan—silun buneng 
zai chi “daguofan”’.
16 People’s Daily, 6 August 1981, p.6, ‘Meiguo jichang tatai zhihui renyuan da ba-
gong yingxiang ju da’.
17 People’s Daily, 1 November 1984, p.3, ‘Jinri shoudu he ge sheng shiqu baozhi 
yaomu’.
18 People’s Daily, 10 June 1986, p.2, ‘Bei modiao de laomo—ji kaifeng dianjichang 
changzhang zheng zhiyong’; 15 July 1986, p.2, ‘Kaifeng shiwei zhichi zheng 
zhiyong gao gaige “bei modiao de laomo” chongxin dangxuan’.
19 People’s Daily, 6 September 1987, p.2, ‘Chenggongzhidao—bufen youxiu nong-
min qiyejia fangwenji (xia)’.
20 People’s Daily, 12 October 1978, p.1, ‘Zai zhongguo gonghui di jiu ci quanguo 
daibiao dahui shang de zhici’.
21 People’s Daily, 16 August 1978, p.1, ‘Zai quanguo nongtian jiben jianshe huiyi de 
jianghui’.
22 People’s Daily, 28 March 1980, p.1, ‘Fahui laomo de daitou, gugan he qiaoliang 
zuoyong’.
23 People’s Daily, 11 October 1980, p.6, ‘Bolan lingdaoren tan guonei jingji xingshi’; 
1980.11.12, p.7, ‘Yinrenzhumu de bolan jushi’.
24 People’s Daily, 3 June 1989, p.1, ‘Beijing shi zonggonghui fabiao shengming—
yaoqiu qudi “gongren zizhi lianhehui”’.
25 The decision to reverse the democratic reforms was couched in such indirect 
terms that even the well-informed scholar Brantly Womack, who had written 
about of the local election controversies in 1980, misread the signals and pre-
dicted that China’s political authorities would persevere with democratic re-
forms (Womack 1982).  
26 People’s Daily, 9 March 1981, p.3, ‘Pingxuan “laomo” buyao ding ming’e’.
27 People’s Daily, 3 May 1982, p.4, ‘[No title].’
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